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Abstract The article proceeds from the argument that war is a social institution and 
not a historical inevitability of human interaction, that is, war can be “unlearned.” 
This process involves deconstructing/dismantling war as an institution in society. An 
important step in this process is to understand the philosophical and cultural bases 
on which technology is employed as “tools” of war. The article focuses on such 
questions as, Is technology just viewed as instruments in the hand of its human 
masters in war? Does technology take on an autonomous role in war? How should we 
assess the impact of context (political, economic, and cultural) of technology when 
employed in war? By exploring these points, the article hopes to provide input into 
the discussion on the control of war technologies and ultimately the dismantling of 
war as an institution in society. 
 
Keywords philosophy of technology; war technologies; instrumentalism; 
dystopianism; constructivism; revolution in military affairs 
 
Since the early 1990s, the United States has been explicitly developing a new model of 
warfare, referred to as the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and more recently 
renamed "transformation." In its current form, the RMA involves the incorporation of 
ever more "advanced" technologies in military organization and tactics, supposedly 
enhancing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, precision targeting, force 
mobility, and logistics to "lift the fog of war." Conceptualizations of this model go 
beyond existing technology, though, to generate a culture of innovation that would 
drive technological advances for future applications in war. 
 
This model is the latest in a number of RMAs driven by technology since the 
formation of the modern state. Although technological models of defense have spread 
(diffused) around the world, the emphasis on technology in warfare is, according to 
Keegan (1993, p. 390), a particularly Western phenomenon. He argues that Western 
culture was receptive to the changes that technology presented, and this is one of the 
main characteristics that led to a "Western manner of war making," that is, a 
technology-intensive way of fighting wars. Although non-Western states have 
adopted technological approaches, too, the West has been at the forefront of the 
development and export of military technological models. Thus, these models reflect 
a Western fetish of technology and as they spread around the world, so this fetish 
spreads, too. 
 
In examining the technological culture of war, this article will discuss how Western 
technological values come to be embodied in military artifacts by employing a 
constructivist approach to technology. In doing so, it will draw on the work of 
Professor Andrew Feenberg (1995, 1998, 1999, p. x), who attempts to bear what he 
calls the "burden of constructivist sociology of technology" (see also Wiebe Bijker, 
1995). This approach transcends three other common views often implicit in 
discourses of military technology, namely, a deterministic, instrumental, and 
dystopian view. Determinism views technology as autonomous and ever advancing, 
that is, creating (or predetermining) futures (or possibilities) for humans. Humans do 
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not control this process but adapt their way of life to it for their own good. 
Instrumentalism characterizes technology as enabling humans, that is, technology 
implies neutral tools in the hands of its users. Humans are the masters, and artifacts 
are only defined in terms of their functions. The dystopian view argues that 
technology twists and distorts humanity by imposing technology itself as an end. The 
aim is to juxtapose these views with a constructivist alternative that offers greater 
understanding of the meaning of military technology in its social context. 
 
Determinism 
Determinism is a product of a long-held view in Western society that technology 
maintains a position akin to science. From the "realm of reason," that is, an objective 
realm separate from society, technology is thought of as an autonomous, progressive 
force, unfolding as if "following a natural trajectory, with existing artifacts being 
replaced by better artifacts in a Darwinian-like order of succession" (Farrell & Terriff, 
2002, p. 12; Feenberg, 1999, p. vii). For the purposes of this discussion on military 
technology, such a view would hold that from the crossbow to F16s, military change is 
driven by the efficiency of design. It is held back only by the speed at which new 
discoveries are made and integrated into military systems. 
 
Those criticizing the strategic logic of defense systems in the aftermath of World War 
II and during the Cold War arms race, for example, the former U.S. president Dwight 
D. Eisenhower (1961) and the British scholar and military analyst Mary Kaldor 
(1981), pose strong critiques of determinism in military technology. Their analyses 
show the fallacy of viewing technological development as an autonomous and 
disinterested process. They criticize the idea that military modernization is the 
unfolding of "an evolutionary potential inherent" in technology, which will direct 
(determine) not only warfare, but society in general, as it unfolds (Hirst, 2001, p. 
149). It is this aspect of determinism, the fact that technology is not humanly 
controlled, that President Eisenhower and Harold Lasswell (1941, 1962) in his 
Garrison State expose. They question the deterministic rationality that seems to steer 
military technological development and acquisition by arguing that humans should 
and do indeed have control over technology. Military technology is not an 
autonomous, progressive force that will necessarily provide improved security as it 
develops, but it is orchestrated by a military-industrial complex, a concept first 
proposed by C. Wright Mills' (1956) in The Power Elite. 
 
The concept military-industrial complex is used to describe the three-way 
relationship among the military, arms industry, and government. It is generally used 
to suggest one of three situations: some kind of collaboration between military and 
industrial elites to control government, an expanding bureaucracy that comes to 
control the arms industry in the name of national security, or corporate elites that 
control the military and government to serve capitalist interests. These situations lead 
to military build-ups, or what Kaldor (1981) calls "baroque arsenals," where the 
increase in technological sophistication (means) is not proportional to the increase in 
security (ends). Technology should therefore be reined in and then applied only when 
it contributes to security. 
 
Instrumentalism 
It is, however, in maintaining the distinction between means and ends that analyses 
such as those by Eisenhower and Lasswell succumb to instrumen talism. They 
assume that technology is a neutral tool and has no inherent meaning of its own. 
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Instead, it can be employed to whatever ends its masters will. The point is thus to 
apply the "right" technology to obtain chosen ends. Their solution is to wrestle 
military technological design away from a secretive, undemocratic military-
industrial-political-scientific elite, overcoming the military impulse that leads to 
excessive and decadent military build-ups (according to Kaldor, 1981). 
Instrumentalism only asks whether given military technologies offer the best 
technological framework to enhance security in a specific context of objectively given 
threats. 
 
Such is the nature of the critiques of current U.S. military technology offered by 
Michael O'Hanlon (1998, 2000), Stephen Biddle (2003), and Bjorn M0ller (2002). 
They question the extent to which the recent wars fought by the United States 
vindicated its technologically intensive strategies. O'Hanlon and M0ller not only 
doubt the utility of high-tech equipment used in the Gulf War but argue that the war 
was unique in too many respects to serve as a model for future military campaigns. 
For M0ller, subsequent attempts at exploiting these technolgies in the Balkans, 
against Iraq, and in Afghanistan have not been particularly convincing. He continues 
to argue that the U.S. model would be irrelevant for most of the likely military 
challenges for the future. Traditional interstate war with a "worthy" (read: similarly 
organized) opponent where advance military technology may be relevant would be 
unwise for the United States to engage in, while "uncivil" wars call for peace 
operations and not offensive force and would in any case be wars that the United 
States would avoid. The "war on terror" would look to homeland defense, placing 
emphasis on aspects, such as improvements in airport security, intelligence gath-
ering, and similar defensive measures as opposed to military means. Stephen Biddle 
(2003) delivers a similar critique of RMA technologies' performance in the Afghan 
case. 
 
Recently analysts have commented on the irrelevance of advanced military 
technology amid an insurgency in Iraq (see, e.g., Boot, 2005). Drayton (2004) asserts, 
for example, "Iraq has shown the hubris of a geostrategy that welds the philosophy of 
the Leviathan to military and technological power." 
 
Today's wars provide no clear distinction between internal and external wars, civil 
and military sectors, legitimate bearers of arms and non-combatants and criminals. 
They are a confluence of war proper, organized crime, and large-scale violations of 
human rights. This type of warfare has also been dubbed postmodern war by Duffield 
(1998) and Ignatieff (2000). The U.S. defense model is not applicable to these "new 
wars" (Kaldor, 1999). 
 
These arguments do not, however, refer to the essence (and constitutive nature) of 
military technology. They merely identify the mismatch between means (neutral 
technology) and objectively deter- minable ends (dealing with contingencies in wars) 
in conceptualizations of a military model. Thus, instrumentalism does not bring us 
any closer to a cultural interpretation that would identify the values embodied in 
military technology and explain how they become incorporated in these devices. This 
is part of the "question of technology" and requires an approach that goes beyond the 
means/ends distinction that underlies instrumental reasoning. The question of 
technology (also translated as "the question concerning technology") is the title of one 
of Martin Heidegger's (1953/1977) books in which he explores the "control" that 
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modern technology comes to exercise over humans. The next section addresses a 
dystopian answer to the question of technology. 
 
Dystopianism 
Dystopian critiques of modernity dating from the 1950s and 1960s provide an 
approach to technology that explores its "substantive" content, not just its 
instrumental value. Feenberg (1999) summarizes this view as follows: 
 
Technology is not neutral but embodies specific values. Its spread is therefore not innocent. The tools 
we use shape our way of life in modern societies where technique has become all pervasive. In this 
situation, means and ends cannot be separated. How we do things determine who we are. 
Technological development transforms what it is to be human. (p. 2) 
 
Dystopianism tries to reduce technology to its essence to expose its true relationship 
to humankind and make it possible to understand all the aspects and problems of this 
relationship. 
 
The essence of the way in which modernity organizes society, according to Ellul 
(1964), Heidegger (1953/1977), Weber (1905/1958), and McLuhan (1964), are 
efficiency and rational control, and these fundamental values are built into 
technology. Technology "reduces everything to functions and raw materials. Goal 
oriented technological practices replace practices which embody human meaning. 
Efficiency sweeps away all other norms and determines an autonomous process of 
technological development" (Feenberg, 1999, p. viii). Efforts to attach nontechnical 
meanings to devices are regarded as interference in the rational realm of technology 
that has a different logic and set of laws. Technology comes to engulf its human 
creators and threaten their continued spiritual and material existence, precisely 
because technical rationality overrides common sense, for example, when economic 
models are based on the idea of unlimited growth in a finite universe (Ellul, 1992, p. 
45). 
 
From a dystopian viewpoint, the values of efficiency and control can be pinpointed in 
modern models of warfare. In imagining future warfare, those conceptualizing U.S. 
military strategies, for example, focus on capabilities, not threats. Future threats (the 
who, where, and why dimensions of threat) are said to be too unpredictable to steer 
future planning, especially in light of the 10 to 30 years R&D and acquisition cycle of 
military equipment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003, p. 6; U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, 2005). Instead, the emphasis is on the "how" dimension—all the possible 
capabilities (technologies) that might be employed to threaten the United States and 
its allies (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002). This is a crucial distinction that shifts 
the focus from the human to the technological element of warfare. These strategies 
try to circumvent uncertainty by anticipating a single future in terms of capabilities. A 
21st-century defense force should have capabilities to allow it to respond to the whole 
plethora of capabilities ("full- spectrum dominance") that might come to threaten the 
United States. Who the enemy is, is less important than how and with what he or she 
might fight. 
 
This is referred to as the capabilities-based approach that replaced the threat-based 
approach in U.S. military planning. This is a mechanistic approach to military 
transformation, because it reduces threat to a technical problem that can be solved 
through technological ingenuity. What is thus at stake here is not response to threat 
but achieving technological superiority in military affairs, which is for those 
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conceptualizing the U.S. model akin to achieving the military high ground. The 
essence of contemporary military models and technologies is efficiency and control. 
An inquiry into the way in which today's military technology serves technical (as 
opposed to human) values in warfare focuses first on the impact that digitization has 
on military culture, what it means to be a soldier and to wage warfare in the computer 
age (Vest, 2000). Extreme versions of dystopianism go further to show how the latest 
military technology spells a future where man and machine, military and civilian 
realms, and peace and war become inseparable (Demchak, 2000, p. 36). Gray (2002) 
concludes, 
 
When one looks closely at the actual proposed implementations in the form of weapons systems and 
doctrines and those cheery war "games" the soldiers like to play, it becomes clear that infowar in 
actuality will just expand war into that new place, cyberspace, and it will just magnify long standing 
trends in postmodern war to add new layers of command and control to the military and to further 
deconstruct the difference between peace and war. It also continues the militarization of outer space, 
the growing integration of humans into weapon systems (cyborg soldiers) and the manic search for 
new technologies, the latest craze being nanotechnology. (p. 56) 
 
This type of inquiry provides a partial answer to the question of which values are 
embodied by today's military technology, but does not answer it sufficiently. It asserts 
that those who conceptualize military models take as primary premises values of 
efficiency and control and that these values come to be embodied by modern weapons 
systems. It thus transcends the means/ends distinction in that the ends are already 
tied up in technology when it is conceptualized and convincingly show how the values 
related to functionality impose themselves where these technologies are applied. But 
to argue that efficiency and rational control are the sum total of meaning embodied 
by these technologies privileges the role that dominant technological actors play in 
technological design and negates the role of ordinary people and their life-world 
experience of these technologies. These life-world experiences would include those of 
the soldiers who operate military technologies, the enemy who are targeted by them, 
the civilians who are killed in their line of fire, the international "human shields" that 
brace a conflict situation to impose a form of restraint on their deployment, those 
who feel liberated from political oppression as a result of their use, the diverse, 
transnational lobby groups that protest against their use, and the scores of people 
who become aware of their existence and application through the mass media or by 
word of mouth. 
 
Constructivism 
Feenberg, drawing on Habermas's idea of "tech- nization of the lifeworld," attempts 
to develop an approach that recognizes these life-world meanings experienced by 
"subordinate" actors and how they come to be embodied by technology (see, e.g., 
Krogh, 1998). His is thus a nonessentialist argument, because the values that 
technology embodies are not just from technical rationality (i.e., functional, efficient), 
but at any given stage will express a range of meanings gathered from past 
experience. Those who conceptualize military models see efficiency as the main value, 
but those who "live" these models see other meanings embodied in military 
technology. Similarly, those whom an advance military force directs itself against 
understand what is happening from their own past experience. If the question of 
technology is only confined to the masters of technology (the conceptualizers of 
arms), there is a divide between technology and meaning. When focusing on ordinary 
people as well, this is not a divide but a terrain of contestation where different actors 
engage with the meaning of technology. "Technologies are not merely efficiency 
devices or efficiency oriented practices, but include their context as these are 
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embodied in design and social insertion" (Feenberg, 1999, p. xiii). Social insertion 
refers to the way technology is fitted into a social setup, often to contribute to social 
receptivity of technology. In modern homes, a fireplace, for example, is aesthetically 
decorated to contribute to the experience of the device as homely and warming. In 
terms of the users of RMA technology, an interesting aspect is how soldiers are able to 
customize their gear. 
 
The marginalization of the role of subordinate actors in the search for the meaning of 
technology is the source of the "deterministic illusion" or the idea that there is an 
autonomous rationality (whether perceived as progressive or detrimental) inherent in 
technology. Bijker (1995, pp. 45, 271) explains that technology is social just as 
institutions are, in that an array of social groups participates in its development. They 
come together and negotiate what is most favorable for their interests during the 
design process. This leads to a process of closure whereby a product is adapted to a 
"socially recognized demand." Like closing a black box, the meaning of the specific 
technology is fixed, and the fact that the technology was a product of a social process 
and that it actually expresses certain worldviews and interests is soon forgotten. The 
final design seems merely the (inevitable) product of technical considerations (see 
also Feenberg, 1999, p. 11). 
 
A constructivist view might seem similar to instrumentalism in that social actors 
come to define the ends (the socially recognized demands) and design means to 
achieve them. It differs, however, in that the choice of technology is not just a choice 
of means; instead, it includes the whole means-ends system. It is not just the uses of 
technology that are at stake but all of its effects during all the stages of its 
development and application. Some effects will not necessarily be related to its uses. 
They may be part of the contextual requirements to apply technology or they may be 
side effects, but all come to impact on technical choices (Feenberg, 1999, p. 7). The 
application of cell phone technology for communication purposes necessitates 
physical contextual requirement (e.g., the erection of cell phone towers that may be 
perceived to ruin a natural landscape) and cultural contextual requirements (e.g., 
changing professional and social expectations of being available to receive or make a 
call). Add to this the debates around the environmental and health side effects of cell 
phone towers and a more complete picture of the meaning of cell phones in addition 
to their use emerges. 
 
A constructivist approach not only acknowledges that means and ends are 
inseparable but introduces contingency into an inquiry into military technology. The 
end product is not the one and only viable alternative that existed, and its design was 
not "locked in" from its inception. There are multiple paths for technological 
development. Only some are taken, and often they are disrupted or changed by other 
developments (Hirst, 2001, p. 149). The factors determining which paths are taken 
and how they will proceed are the result of an array of socially negotiated under-
standings rather than technical superiority. Design reflects the understanding of 
designers of their role in society and their interests in relation to groups, such as 
politicians, consumers, and corporate managers (Drake, 1995, p. 349). It also reflects 
the significance society attributes to certain circumstances (e.g., mobilized public 
opinion around global climate change will manifest in greener designs). 
 
It is necessary to return to the question of how military technologies come to embody 
values that lead to a mechanistic approach to war. The mechanistic approach to war is 
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symptomatic of a denial of the social dimensions of technology. But technology is 
profoundly social. The privileging of technical rationality (efficiency, functionality) in 
conceptualization of military models reflects a fetish with technology. Why does this 
happen? In modern society, technology presents itself to society primarily through its 
function. All other qualities (e.g., aesthetics, spirituality, ethics) are secondary. Unlike 
with natural objects, this immediate perception of technology as differentiated into 
primary functional qualities and secondary social qualities rips technology from its 
social context. The essence of technology becomes for society its function. As such, 
Feenberg (1999) explains that technology is not viewed as possessing any normative 
content but rather consists of structures that correspond to its function. "Insofar as 
structures have an internal causal logic, they can be abstracted from their social 
surround as an instance of causal principles. All systematic knowledge of technology 
rests on this type of abstraction" (p. 212). As technical disciplines arise and expand to 
explain these structures and to pursue their perfection, so they set the criteria for 
judging technology. Soon, it becomes common sense to see devices only in terms of 
their structures. Their function (abstracted in this way from their social context) is 
what links the subjective uses of devices with their internal causal logic. Function 
thus becomes the link between society and technology, but it remains abstracted from 
its social context. It is precisely this abstraction that distinguishes technology from, 
for example, rocks on the beachfront or trees in a forest. 
 
In the same way, this illusion of technology as objective and autonomous is 
constitutive in the case of military technology, because those who conceptualize it act 
on the illusion. They do not see a difference in the essence of military technology 
when employing it in the Gulf War (1990) or the Iraq War (2003), for example. Yet, 
the former had significantly more international and Iraqi support compared to the 
latter. The constitutive role of social context on technology is clear. The lack of 
support for the Iraq War and occupation, and its subsequent manifestation in the 
insurgency, leads to a failure of one of the main promises of advanced military 
technology, namely, decisive force. Analysts see this as certain technologies not being 
applicable to the type of warfare the United States is called upon to fight. Those 
conceptualizing military technology go back to the drawing board and see how they 
can fix the (technical) problem and make their technology more suitable for conflict 
at the insurgency level of conflict. Their fallacy is to see technology as autonomous 
from its context. Somehow, the wrong technology was applied to the problem. But 
would the same technologies not have been praised if the Iraq War had been 
supported more broadly and if the end of formal combat operations meant the 
acceptance of the United States as liberators? 
 
A recent Wired magazine article heading reads, "How technology almost lost the war: 
In Iraq, the critical networks are social—not electronic." The article discusses the 
inadequacy of advanced technology to "win hearts and minds." The author, Noah 
Shachtman (2007), quotes John Nagl, who helped to write the U.S. Army's new 
counterinsurgency manual, as saying 
 
The real problem with network-centric warfare is that it helps us only destroy. But in the 21st century, 
that's just a sliver of what we're trying to do. It solves a problem I don't have—fighting some 
conventional enemy—and helps only a little with a problem I do have: how to build a society in the face 
of technology- enabled, super-empowered individuals. 
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He then sings the praises of the newly deployed human terrain teams (HTTs) 
consisting of social scientists, software experts, and people knowledgeable on local 
culture to serve as "cultural councillors" to each commander. 
At face value, the HTTs go beyond the mechanistic approach to warfare. But 
polarizing the debate into two mutually exclusive extremes where technology- 
centered approaches in war "destroy" and human- centered approaches "build" 
society again misses the point. The meaning of technology reveals itself in its social 
context where it reflects certain social norms but also confirms or undermines other 
norms. It is "this life- world of technology (that) is the place of meaning in modern 
societies" (Feenberg, 1999, p. 197). Those who conceptualize military models look to 
the experience of military technologies in the Iraq War to score their efficiency in 
warfare overall. For constructivists, on the other hand, this experience "constitutes an 
essential dimension of the contemporary struggle for a humane and livable world" 
(Feenberg, 1999, p. 199). Sometimes, societies accept that for a future humane and 
livable world, they may have to contend with technologies that destroy. It is when the 
destruction does not make sense, for example, when its cause or end goal is suspect 
(war for oil, cultural discrimination, or geopolitical domination as opposed to a "just 
war") and its nature is outside acceptable norms of humanitarian law (e.g., 
proportionality) that military technology is experienced as socially destructive. 
 
Conclusions 
The focus of this article is on the culture that drives contemporary military 
technological developments and its diffusion worldwide, but it has broader 
applications that touch on social responsibility at the nexus of science, technology, 
and world affairs. First, it sheds light on past technological developments in military 
affairs, such as nuclear weapons. The (ir)rationality of the nuclear arms race and 
mutual deterrence/assured destruction strategies of the Cold War is embedded in the 
myth that military technological superiority per se provides security. Development 
and testing of nuclear weapons systematically ignores the social context of these 
weapons or deems the context less important than the developments themselves. 
Second, the article works from the assumption that war is not inevitable but a social 
institution that can be dismantled and "uninstituted." Military technology plays a 
significant role in instituting war, not least through the military-industrial-scientific 
complex. An important step in dismantling the institution of war is to understand the 
philosophical and cultural bases on which technology is employed as tools of war. 
Last, a constructivist view of military technology dispels the myth that technological 
"progress" cannot be held back or that the meaning of technology is only related to its 
function. It recognizes how technology embodies and spreads social values and that 
the social context in which technology is developed and applied matters.  
 
Understanding this is essential when scientist and engineers want to develop socially 
responsible products of science and technology. 
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